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NOTES

PENNSYLVANIA'S CAPTAIN-OF-THE-SHIP DOCTRINE
A MID-TWENTIETH CENTURY ANACHRONISM
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
applying Pennsylvania law, held in Mazer v. Lipschutz1 that there
was plain or fundamental error in a jury charge that a surgeon
was not responsible for any negligence on the part of hospital employees. The court remanded for new trial on the issue of the
surgeon's vicarious liability.
The court in remanding for a new trial on the issue of respondeat superior2 felt bound by Pennsylvania law on the subject.
Their thinking follows the present Pennsylvania trend of vicarious
liability in the operating room. Mazer marks another step in Pennsylvania's ever-expanding orbit of the surgeon's liability for preoperative mistakes of hospital personnel.
Professor Israel Abrams entered Albert Einstein Medical Center, Southern Division, for an elective3 cholecystectomy. 4 He was
admitted to Room 807. The admitting surgeon was Dr. Benjamin
Lipschutz. Dr. Peter Chodoff, who was to administer the anesthetic for the surgical procedure, ordered two pints of blood prior
to surgery. Mr. Albert Kohn, technician in charge of the hospital
blood bank, checked the hospital census, saw an Israel Abrams registered in Room 342, and ordered a blood sample drawn. The typing of the blood sample revealed group A Rh positive. Later the
same day, Kohn was informed of another Israel Abrams in Room
807. He then called for a blood specimen from the Israel Abrams
in Room 807. This was typed as group 0 Rh positive. On the
following morning, as ordered by Dr. Chodoff, one pint of blood
was placed in the operating room prior to surgery. This bottle
was marked "Israel Abrams, 342 A Positive." During the course of
surgery, the patient went into hemorrhagic shock, and Dr. Chodoff
prepared to give the blood. Upon noticing the discrepancy in room
numbers, he called Kohn to the operating room. Kohn told Dr.
Chodoff that he, Kohn, had labeled the bottle marked "342 A Posi1. 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963), affirming in part, and reversing in part
31 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and remanding for new trial on the issue of
respondeat superior as to the surgeon.
2. BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1957). Let the master answer.
This maxim means that a master is liable in certain cases for the wrongful
acts of his servant, and a principal for those of his agent.
3. Elective in a medical connotation is used to designate a planned
procedure from one that is an emergency. The term is used in all branches
of medicine.
4. BLAKISTON, NEw GouLD MEDICAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1956). A
cholecystectomy is the excision of the gallbladder and cystic duct.
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tive." Kohn further told Dr. Chodoff that the room number was
a clerical error, that the blood was the correct type, and that it was
proper to give it to Professor Abrams. Abrams subsequently went
into acute renal failure 5 as a result of an incompatible blood transfusion and died on the sixteenth post-operative day.
The administrator of the estate of Israel Abrams filed suit
against Dr. Lipschutz and Dr. Chodoff. The two cases were consolidated for trial in the district court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. The jury found no individual negligence on the part
of either doctor as a contibuting cause of Abrams' death. They
also found that negligence of an employee of Albert Einstein Hospital was a contributing cause of death. Plaintiff had previously
executed a release in favor of the hospital. In light of the jury's
findings, there was a verdict in favor of the defendant doctors.
Plaintiff then filed motions for new trial in both suits. Both
motions were denied 6 and the appeals followed.
The trial judge stated in his jury charge that neither physician
was responsible for any negligence, if there was any, on the part of
other hospital employees. As a result of this charge, the jury was
not allowed to consider the application of the respondeat superior
doctrine. The circuit court of appeals held this to be plain or fundamental error and remanded for new trial on the issue of Dr. Lipschutz's liability in respondeat superior.
This Note will evaluate Pennsylvania's "Captain-of-the-Ship"
doctrine which analogizes the surgeon to the master of a ship and
attributes to the surgeon the same supreme control over any person
who brings himself within the confines of the operating room.
The doctrine presumes the surgeon's control regardless of the other's purpose for being in the operating room, regardless of his
location (whether in the immediate operative field or in the corridor adjacent to the operating room), and regardless of the surgeon's actual knowledge of the other's presence. The doctrine will
be evaluated by an analysis of its fundamental component-the concept of control. The Pennsylvania position will then be compared
with other jurisdictions which have adopted a more realistic view
of the concept of control as it applies to operative liability.
FUNDAMENTAL

AGENCY CONCEPTS

The doctrine respondeat superior arises from a master-servant
relationship. Certain criteria have been established at commonlaw as indicative of this relationship; namely, the right of the mas5. Acute renal failure means sudden severe reduction of kidney excretory function. The most frequent and important cause of sudden kidney
failure is acute tubular necrosis (lower nephron nephrosis). This is potentially reversible and occurs most commonly after crushing injuries, mismatched blood, major shock or burns, and in certain specific cases of poison
ingestion.
6. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 31 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
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ter to select the servant, pay his wages, discharge him, and control
7
his conduct.
Today, however, there has been a shift in emphasis from the
original common-law criteria to the criterion of the master's right
to control the servant.8 Mechem 9 feels that what is meant by control is not so much the right to control each and every physical
movement of the servant, but rather the expectation that the servant will follow the master's directions as to the manner in which
services are to be performed. Respondeat superior, or, as it has
sometimes been called, vicarious liability, is liability without fault.
The doctrine is by no means a statement of universal principle, but
is rather an exception to our Anglo-American tort concepts.'O A
variety of reasons have been proposed to explain its origin." Mechem 2 feels that the rule is not founded upon natural justice, but
rather on grounds of expediency. Laski's flatly states that the
basis of the rule is rooted in public policy. In a social distribution
of profit and loss, balance seems best obtained if the employer,
though without
fault, is compelled to bear the burden of his serv4
ant's torts.'
It is vitally important to note that the concept of respondeat
superior is an exception, in fact the very antithesis of our fundamental tort concepts of negligence; as such its breadth and scope
should be guarded jealously by the courts.15
GENESIS OF THE CAPTAIN-OF-THE-SHIP DOCTRINE

This doctrine was a creation of the majority opinion in McConnell v. Williams,'0 decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
7. 35 Am. JUR. Master and Servant § 3 (1941).
8. Adherhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY § 220(1) (1958): "A servant is a person employed
to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other's
control or right to control."
9. MECHEM, OUTLINES OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 415 (4th ed. 1952).
10. Mechem, Employer's Liability, 4 ILL. L. REV. 243, 249 (1909).
11. Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liability, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916);
Mechem, supra note 10, at 248-49, where he lists:
(1) the master put
the original force in motion, so he should answer for the consequences;
(2) the master is the one who benefits from the service, so he should take
the burden; (3) between two equally innocent parties, the master should
bear the loss because he employed the servant and thus made the injurious
act possible; (4) this rule will secure greater care and diligence by the
master in his selection of servants; (5) masters should be held liable because, as a class, they are more apt to be pecuniarily responsible; (6) the
master gives commands to his servant, and thus he impliedly commanded
the negligent act; and (7) a composite of all these reasons.
12. Mechem, supra note 10, at 249.
13. Laski, supra note 11, at 111.
14. Laski, supra note 11, at 112.
15. Mechem, supra note 10, at 250.
16. 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243 (1949).
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in 1949. The decision moved Pennsylvania into line with the majority of jurisdictions applying agency principles to medical malpractice actions. 17 The defendant doctor was Chief of Staff in Obstetrics at a charitable hospital. He was employed by plaintiff to
perform a Cesarian section and to care for mother and child immediately thereafter. The physician asked a specific intern to assist
him at surgery. Intern Davidson told the physician that he was no
longer on the obstetrical service, but that intern Corston was. The
physician then asked Davidson to tell Corston to be present to
assist him. After delivery of the child, complications developed
requiring the full attention of the surgeon. The intern instilled an
excessive quantity of silver nitrate into the infant's eyes causing
loss of one eye. The court was faced with determination of liability under respondeat superior. In remanding for a new trial on
the issue, the court stated that a jury might find that the intern
was a borrowed servant of the defendant doctor. Control was established on two theories: (1) the physician's statement at the
trial that he had complete control of the operating room and every
person therein during the course of the operation; and (2) the
physician's message to the on-service intern to be present. Mr.
Justice Stearn, delivering the majority opinion said:
And indeed it can readily be understood that in the course
of an operation in the operating room of a hospital, and until the surgeon leaves that room at the conclusion of the
operation . . . he is in the same complete charge of those

who are present and assisting him as is the captain of a
ship over all on board, and that such supreme control is
indeed essential in view of the high degree of protection to
which an anesthetized, unconscious patient is entitled.
18

Thus was born the "Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine. Since its
birth it has grown steadily in scope. Initially and specifically intended for the operative setting, it has been broadened to encompass pre-operative negligence occurring in the vicinity of the operating room,19 and indeed, even pre-operative negligence in areas
20
of the modern hospital quite distant from the operating room.
From the rather narrow limitation of "those who are present and
assisting him," have come decisions holding the surgeon liable for
negligence of an intern 2 1 and a blood bank technician,2 2 neither
17. See e.g., Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal.2d 82, 64 P.2d 409 (1936); Davis v.
Potter, 51 Idaho 81, 2 P.2d 318 (1938); Aderhold v. Bishop, 94 Okla. 203,
221 Pac. 752 (1923).
18. McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. at 362, 65 A.2d at 246.
19. Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961) (in anesthesia
induction room); Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961) (in
anesthesia induction room).
20. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959) (in emergency
room).
21. Ibid.
22. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963), affirming in
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of whom ever entered the operating room. The doctrine has arisen
to such stature that courts recite23it whatever the factual setting,
as if mesmerized by its intonations.
Yorston v. Penne 2 4 was the first Pennsylvania case holding a
surgeon liable in respondeat superior for negligence occurring outside the operating room. In Yorston, the negligence occurred in
the emergency room of the hospital where the junior intern,2 5 while
taking the patient's history, negligently failed to record an allergy
to penicillin. The majority, by some rather abstruse reasoning,
26
found that the junior intern was an agent of the surgical resident,
since by telling the junior intern to record the history and physical (a duty not ordinarily required of junior interns) the resident
exercised sufficient control. The surgical resident was in turn the
agent of the defendant surgeon since he was chosen by defendant
to perform the planned operative procedure in his place. This established control from the defendant surgeon to the junior intern.
The hospital director revealed, however, that taking histories were
general duties of junior interns upon request by any physician.
These facts place considerable strain on the majority's finding of
control on the stated ground that the junior intern didn't have to
take the history, but did so when ordered by the surgical resident.
This strain was perhaps evident to the majority as well, for they
part, and reversing in part 31 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and remanding
for new trial on the issue of respondeat superior as to the surgeon.
23. Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), aff'd 273
F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959); Dohr v. Smith, 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958); Mazer
v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1963), affirming in part, and reversing in
part 31 F.R.D. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1962), and remanding for new trial on the
issue of respondeat superior as to the surgeon; Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa.
574, 173 A.2d 154 (1961); Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
24. 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255 (1959).
25. Junior interns are fourth year medical students who work in many
of the larger hospitals. They perform essentially the same function as
interns, with perhaps slightly more emphasis on performance of histories
and physicals. The designation is basically designed to avoid confusing
them with the interns, who have already received their M.D. degree and
are fulfilling a state requirement which is necessary before they can be
licensed to practice medicine.
26. A resident in medical parlance is a physician who has graduated
from medical school, completed his internship, and is furthering his medical training in one of the specialties of medicine. The length of the residency varies from two to five years, depending on the specialty. During
this time the resident learns the specialty by attending lectures, observing
the staff physicians handle their private patients, aiding and assisting the
staff men in their care of the private patients, and handling patients of
their own under supervision of the members of the teaching staff of the
hospital. At the end of the prescribed time, the physician is then board
eligible. He can go into private practice outside the hospital as a specialist
in his field. After a prescribed period of time, he can take an oral and
written examination. Upon passing this examination he is then board certified. The actual derivation of the term resident probably came from the
requirement that they actually live or reside in the hospital during this
period of training.
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did not rely solely on this finding of control to vest responsibility.
To buttress their strained extension of the control concept, they
seized upon another act by the junior intern. After realizing that
he had forgotten to record the allergy, he went to the operating
room to rectify his mistake. The junior intern, however, was not
dressed to enter the operating room, so he relayed the information
to a nurse anesthetist requesting her to make a proper correction
on the history and physical sheet. This act by the junior intern
occurred while the surgery was in process, and it happened at the
door to the operating room. Since the surgical resident had control of all personnel in the operating room during the course of the
surgical procedure, the majority had little trouble imputing to the
surgical resident the knowledge which the junior intern had given
to the nurse anesthetist. It was incumbent upon the majority at
this point to find some negligent act committed during the course
of the operation. They found this in the dictation of the postoperative orders, one of which was the order for penicillin. These
orders were dictated by the resident while he was in the operating
room, and prior to the completion of the surgical procedure. The
patient, approximately one week after receiving a series of penicillin injections, suffered a stroke. It is immediately apparent that if
the surgical resident had control of the junior intern when he
failed to record the allergy, knowledge of the allergy was at once
imputed to the surgical resident. 27 The trip to the operating room
by the junior intern and his subsequent conversation with the nurse
anesthetist could add nothing to this knowledge.
Apart from the rather technical consideration of control, however, it would seem that the court abandoned the purpose of the
"Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine as stated in McConnell. That purpose was to protect an anesthetized, unconscious patient from negligent acts of individuals who are present to assist in the procedure, and who may not be able to recompense the injured plaintiff. This was the rationale of McConnell. Yorston is a radical
departure from it. No negligence occurred in the operating room.
The operative procedure was successful in every detail. The anesthetized, unconscious patient was subjected to no acts of negligence.
Ordering the penicillin was no more a part of the operation than
was serving the next evening's supper tray. When the first penicillin injection was given the patient was neither anesthetized nor
unconscious. On the contrary, he was awake, alert and in such
possession of his faculties that he objected to the penicillin shot.
By their decision in Yorston the majority, in effect, has established the operating room as a convenient depository where all prior
acts of negligence can at last be laid to rest. This applies though
the surgeon had no actual control of the individual committing the
27. Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28 at 35 and 40, 153 A.2d 255 at 258
and 260.
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negligence and even when the negligence was totally unrelated
to the success or failure of the surgery.
Rockwell v. Kaplan2 represents a further extension of the
"Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine. The court extended the control fiction to include the Chief of the Department of Anesthesiology.
To understand the court's reasoning in Rockwell v. Kaplan,29 consideration of its companion case, Rockwell v. Stone, 0 is required.
Plaintiff Rockwell was to have an elective bursectomy 31 performed
by the surgeon, Dr. Kaplan. In the induction room prior to surgery, a resident in anesthesiology, pursuant to the directions of defendant Dr. Stone, Chief of Anesthesiology, attempted to administer sodium pentothal intra-venously. The administration was negligent, and the drug was injected into or adjacent to the artery.
The resident notified Dr. Stone at once. Dr. Stone decided to say
nothing to the surgeon about the accident. He gave the patient a
general anesthetic. Dr. Kaplan did the planned operation never
knowing of the negligent acts which had occurred. The untreated
arterial spasm which resulted, ultimately necessitated amputation
of the arm. Dr. Stone was held liable for personal negligence in
proceeding with the general anesthesia after being notified of the
catastrophe. He was also held liable under respondeat superior
for negligence of the anesthesiology resident. The court applied
the "Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine correctly, stating that the sodium pentothal had been administered in the induction room which
32
was under the control, direction, and supervision of Dr. Stone.
He was truly the captain of the ship.
The court in Rockwell v. Kaplan33 then held the surgeon liable
in respondeat superior for the negligence of Dr. Stone. In Yorston,
there was an act occurring in the operating room, i.e., the ordering
of penicillin by the surgeon's agent, which led to the eventual
injury. Even though the act was unrelated to the surgical procedure, and thus outside the rationale of McConnell, there was an
act by an agent in the operating room. The decision in Rockwell v.
Kaplan34 cut this last tenuous thread of connection to McConnell.
All negligent acts occurred prior to the patient's entry into the
operating room. As in Yorston, the operation was flawless. The
issue squarely before the court was whether the surgeon was liable
under respondeat superior for a negligent act which occurred outside his presence and without his knowledge during the pre-operative administration of anesthesia. The majority found the neces28. 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
29. Ibid.
30. 404 Pa. 561, 173 A.2d 48 (1961).
31. BLAKISTON, op. cit. supra note 4. A bursectomy is the surgical removal of a bursa which is a small sac filled with fluid interposed between
parts that move upon one another.
32. Rockwell v. Stone, 404 Pa. at 566, 173 A.2d at 50 (1961).
33. 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
34. 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
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sary requisite of control in Dr. Kaplan's statement that he had the
authority to tell the anesthesiologist to discontinue the anesthesia at
any moment he chose when such course would be in the best interest of his patient. There seems to be little revolutionary in that
statement; one would hardly expect otherwise. There are a variety
of reasons why an anesthesiologist would discontinue an anesthetic
when asked to do so by a surgeon, all of which are of greater
import than the reason assigned by the court. The most cogent reason is that both men share a mutual desire for the welfare of the
patient; equally as important would be the anesthesiologist's recognition of the professional skill and judgment of the requesting surgeon. It is important to note that the converse of the majority's
conclusion is equally valid. There would be no hesitation or argument among skilled surgeons if an anesthesiologist told them to
discontinue the procedure because the patient was deteriorating
from the effects of the anesthetic. Thus the majority's reason for
their finding of unilateral control is singularly devoid of merit.
The great difficulty of the court seems to turn on an improper
application of respondeat superior based on erroneous concepts of
control in the operative setting. The right to control is to be ascertained by going back to the time, place, and circumstances of the
servant's negligent act. Mechem3 5 feels that the right to control is
an after the fact conclusion of law used by the courts to vest responsibility. He describes the concept as a matter of intuition"6 on
the part of a hypothetical observer, that considering normal usages
and particular circumstances, the relationship is one in which it is
taken for granted that the actor is to respect the wishes of the
constituent as to the manner of doing the job. Perhaps the difficulty of the courts is in their attempt to play the part of Mechem's
hypothetical observer in a field where usages are not normal and
relationships cannot be taken for granted. In this setting, the legal
concept of control must be viewed against its appropriate medical
background. In mid-twentieth century America as a medical fact of
life, the surgeon does not have control over the anesthesiologistnor should he. The anesthesiologist is an independent contractor
subject only to his conscience and the ordinary standards of care
applicable to any other practitioner of medicine. He is no more a
servant of the surgeon and subject to his control than is the pathologist who reads the frozen section 37 and gives the surgeon his operative diagnosis. The anesthesiologist is another specialist, legally
owing the same degree of care to the patient. He exercises his
professional duties concurrently with the surgeon.38 Most sur35. MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 9 at § 415.
36. Ibid.
37. BLAKISTON, op. cit. supra note 4. Histologic sections cut from frozen tissues or organs, as from those removed from the body during operation and examined immediately for possible malignancy.
38. WASMUTH, ANESTHESIA AND THE LAW, 41 (1961).
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geons welcome the sharing of responsibility, the professional assistance of a specialist in anesthesiology, and the improvement in the
quality of anesthesia.3 9 Candor compels one to admit, however,
that not all surgeons welcome this trend, as it poses a threat to
their previously pre-eminent position.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF MAZER v. LIPSCHUTZ

By its decision in Rockwell v. Kaplan,40 it would seem that the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania brought the entire confines of
the hospital within the purview of the "Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine. Thus it is not surprising that the court of appeals permitted
an extension of the doctrine from operating room into hospital
laboratory.
The majority opinion in Mazer fell prey to the same basic misconception which plagued the Yorston majority. They established
the surgeon's control by finding that the negligent party came to
the operating room during the course of the surgery. This brought
him within the surgeon's sphere of control, and as a result, the
negligence was attributed to the surgeon. Dr. Chodoff, the anesthesiologist, ordered blood prepared for the patient. He noted the
potential source of error prior to transfusion and called the blood
bank technician to the operating room to explain the labeling. Evidently Dr. Lipschutz was silent during this time, which is not unexpected since he was handling the surgical emergency, i.e., control
of the heavy bleeding. The first negligent act occurred in the laboratory when the technician sent a pint of A Positive blood to the
operating room to be available for a patient whose blood had been
typed as 0 Positive. The second negligent act occurred when Kohn,
summoned to the operating room and questioned by Dr. Chodoff,
stated that the room number was a clerical error and that the blood
was the correct type for their patient. This negligent act occurred
in the operating room or the scrub room immediately adjacent to
the operating room, and in the presence of both surgeon and
anesthesiologist. The court found that the injury producing act,
i.e., giving the blood transfusion, was an essential part of the operation. The way was then cleared to ask whether or not Kohn
became the agent of the surgeon when he was summoned to the
operating room to explain the apparent mislabeling. The court reasoned that because Kohn was summoned to the operating room
and came, he was made a servant of the surgeon and subject to his
control. The negligence in Kohn's reply was imputed from the
servant to the master, and the surgeon was liable for the incompatible blood transfusion. It is submitted that Kohn's response to
the call from the operating room can in no way be considered as
submission to another's control. He responded because it was his
job to run the blood bank, and this was a legitimate question about
39.
40.

Ibid.
404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
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his work. His response was unrelated to any submission to control
by either Chodoff or Lipschutz. The only person who had control
or the right to control the manner and mode of Kohn's work was
the pathologist in charge of the hospital's laboratory. The surgeon
had nothing to say about who did the laboratory work on his patients, or how it was done. If there were a disagreement between
the surgeon and the pathologist in charge of the laboratory about
the mechanics of a laboratory procedure, the authority of the
pathologist would be supreme. He controls the personnel in the
hospital laboratory. The fact that they go to another part of the
hospital to answer a question, in no way lessens his degree of control nor strengthens the surgeon's.
Even assuming arguendo that Lipschutz had "control" of Kohn
when he appeared at the operating room door, the primary negligence had already occurred in the blood bank. The majority forgot
Mechem's 41 warning that control is to be ascertained as of the time,
place, and circumstances of the negligent occurrence. Clearly Lipschutz had no control over Kohn when he negligently sent the
wrong pint of blood to the operatingroom.
The majority is wrong for a third reason. It is implicit in
their opinion that while speaking in terms of respondeat superior,
they are thinking in terms of personal negligence. On three separate occasions 42 they mention that the conversation between Chodoff and Kohn in the operating room occurred in Lipschutz's presence. It is apparent that the court was thinking in terms of personal negligence on the part of Dr. Lipschutz for not asking that
further tests be run on the blood. This is not liability based on
respondeat superior. Personal negligence rather than respondeat
superior is the basis for liability when a physician is held for careless acts of others which he observed or could have observed, or as
in Mazer heard or could have heard. This type of thinking was
error since the trial court had already decided that the surgeon was
not guilty of personal negligence.
The Mazer dissent has even less to offer. It simply added
another party as an intermediate link in the chain of control. By
so doing the dissent incorrectly placed the onus of control on the
anesthesiologist instead of incorrectly on the surgeon. There is
little merit in this approach. The dissent reasoned that because
Chodoff ordered the blood and questioned Kohn, Kohn was acting
under Chodoff's orders and on his business; therefore, he was a
servant of Chodoff. It then said: "Where there are specialists connected with a phase of an operation, it is highly unlikely that doctors in charge would have enough familiarity with the particular
to have effective control over the manner of performprocedure
43
ance."
41.
42.

MECHEM, op. Cit. supra note 9 at §§ 466-68.
Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42 at 45, 49 and 50 (3d Cir. 1963).

43. Id. at 56.
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This quotation admits that there was no right to control moving from Lipschutz to Chodoff. Then the dissent said that Pennsylvania would countenance liability on Dr. Lipschutz for his agent
Dr. Chodoff, whose sub-agent, Kohn, was negligent. 44 These statements are not only incongruous but diametrically opposed.
The present method of applying the control concept, i.e., looking only to the surgeon as master, can result in inequity and injustice both to patient and surgeon. Rockwell v. Kaplan45 and
Mazer are excellent examples in point. In Rockwell, the negligence though committed pre-operatively, continued, unknown to
the surgeon, throughout the entire surgical procedure. In Mazer
the primary negligence also occurred pre-operatively, but was
brought to bear upon the patient in the operating room. Some
courts, sensing the obvious injustice in holding the surgeon liable
for this type of negligence, simply say he had no control. The patient then has recourse against the anesthesiology resident and
hospital in a case like Rockwell, or against technician and hospital
in a case like Mazer. A judgment against resident or technician,
however, may be meaningless if they are uninsured. If the jurisdiction still has charitable immunity, 4 the patient is simply out of
luck and goes uncompensated for his injury. Other courts, realizing that there are two innocent parties, one of whom has been
severely injured, fictionalize this expanded control concept to find
liability. They turn a myopic gaze to the only person seemingly
available and hold him liable.
Proper application of the control concept to the operative setting would result in a just allocation of liability. By proper application, the legal symmetry of the concept would not be tortured
and twisted, the true master would respond in damages for his
servant's negligence, and the plaintiff would not go uncompensated
for the wrong which he has sustained. By applying the concept
correctly, liability would be placed on the Chief of Anesthesiology
47
for a pre-operative anesthetic mistake as in Rockwell v. Kaplan.
By applying the concept correctly, liability would be placed on the
Chief of Pathology for a negligent act in the blood bank as in
Mazer. This approach would force the responsible party, i.e., the
one with actual control, to respond in damages. Courts, on the
other hand, would not be reluctant to find liability, and plaintiffs
44. Mazer v. Lipschutz, 327 F.2d 42, 55 (3d Cir. 1963) (concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
45. 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
46. A discussion of charitable immunity is beyond the scope of this
Note. The thought has been expressed, though subtlely, by various courts
and learned writers in the field that the risk of vicarious liability to the
physician is much greater where the hospital institutions are immune from
suit. See LOUISELL & WILLIAMS, THE PARENCHYMA OF LAW 482 (1960);

LeTourneau, Medical Malpractice-Liability for the Acts of Others, 1966,
MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. TECH. 93, 109.
47.

404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54 (1961).
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would not go uncompensated, even in those jurisdictions having
charitable immunity. This approach would have the additional
salutary effect of making each master police his own area and personnel since he would be answerable for their negligence. Even
though it may require a much closer scrutiny of the facts viewed
against a medical background, this type of an approach seems
eminently better than making liability turn on whether or not
there was a fortuitous trip to the operating room-a trip heretofore
seized upon by the courts as a convenient depository for all prior
and continuing negligent acts unassociated with the success or failure of the surgery.
OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Pennsylvania is in the minority in its sweeping affixation of
liability on the surgeon for pre-operative errors of others. In other
jurisdictions when the negligent act causing the injury occurs preoperatively, while patient and operating room are being prepared
for the surgery, the surgeon is usually not responsible. 4
When the patient is injured post-operatively by negligence of a
nurse, intern, or other hospital employee, courts generally fail to
hold the surgeon liable. 49 This is true even though a nurse or
intern may have been acting on specific orders from a surgeon. 50
When the negligence of nurse, intern, or other hospital employee occurs during the surgery, there is a division of authority.
Most courts hold that when the surgeon assumes supervision and
direction in the operating room, usually, although not necessarily
when the operation begins, 51 he becomes totally responsible for the
48. Blackman v. Zeligs, 90 Ohio App. 304, 103 N.E.2d 13 (1951); (Patient burned by a chemical applied by hospital personnel); McCowen v.
Sisters of Most Precious Blood of Enid, 208 Okla. 130, 253 P.2d 830 (1953),
wherein the court reasoned that it was common knowledge that the preparation of a patient for surgery in the hospital operating room is done by
the hospital's nursing staff and the charges therefore are part of the hospital fees and not the surgeon's fee. Contra, Emerson v. Chapman, 138
Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820 (1929), where the nurse, in removing adhesive tape
in the operating room used a fluid which severely burned the patient's skin.
This occurred prior to surgery, on order of the surgeon, and in his immediate presence.
49. Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910) (negligent dressing of a
wound); Reynolds v. Smith, 148 Iowa 264, 127 N.W. 192 (1910) (negligent
dressing of a wound); Hunner v. Stevenson, 122 Md. 40, 89 Atl. 418 (1913)
(negligent dressing of a wound); Scacchin v. Montgomery, 365 Pa. 377, 75

A.2d 535 (1950) (post-operative bleeding. The court said that even if the
intern had been negligent in failing to call surgeon in time, there would be
no liability on the surgeon); Meadows v. Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109
S.W.2d 417 (1937) (patient injured while thrashing about in immediate postsurgical period).
50. Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (intern broke off
needle while performing hypodermoclysis on a patient); Shull v. Schwartz,
364 Pa. 554, 73 A.2d 402 (1950) (question of intern's negligence in removing
sutures post-operatively).
51. Beadles v. Metayka, 135 Colo. 366, 311 P.2d 711 (1957), involved
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negligence of his assistants.5 2 The reason most often assigned for
placing liability upon the surgeon is one of borrowed servant. 53
The minority courts5 4 assign two basic reasons for finding nonliability: (1) surgery requires the entire thought of the surgeon,
and diverting his attention to routine matters is disservice to the
patient; 55 and (2) nurses and interns, especially when following
standard hospital procedures,58 are independent contractors and
not borrowed servants. 57 The latter contention is not without
merit since many of the negligent acts occur during the routine
tasks of these personnel. Time consuming supervision of operating
room personnel by the surgeon would not inure to the benefit of
the patient since there would be proportionately less time for actual
patient care.
The general trend in recent years has been to regard the
physician-anesthesiologist as an independent contractor, with a
duty to his patient and individual liabilty upon himself.58 This
general rule was probably first established in Morey v. Thybo.59
The court held that the physician administering the anesthetic was
not liable for negligence of the physician performing the delivery,
a suit against a surgeon for injuries sustained when a patient fell off the

operating room table after being rendered unconscious from anesthesia.
The surgeon ordered the patient positioned on his side. He then told the
orderly to go get a strap. The orderly left the side of the patient, and the
patient fell to the floor. The Beadles court felt that the beginning of the
surgical procedure and the moment of assumption of control by the surgeon
were not automatically simultaneous. It is rather a question of fact to be
ascertained in each case. The opinion seems emminently well reasoned.
52. Saucier v. Ross, 112 Miss. 306, 73 So. 49 (1916); Emerson v. Chapman, 138 Okla. 270, 280 Pac. 820 (1929); Johnson v. Ely, 30 Tenn. App. 294,
205 S.W.2d 759 (1947); Harber v. Gledhill, 60 Utah 391, 208 Pac. 1111 (1922).
53. Sherman v. Hartman, 137 Cal. App.2d 589, 290 P.2d 894 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); Wood v. Miller, 158 Ore. 444, 76 P.2d 963 (1938); Huggins v.
Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957); Minogue v. Rutland Hospital,
Inc., 119 Vt. 336, 125 A.2d 796 (1956).
54. Hallinan v. Prindle, 17 Cal. App.2d 656, 62 P.2d 1075 (Dist. Ct. App.
1936); Watson v. Fahey, 135 Me. 376, 197 At. 402 (1938); Hale v. Atkins,
215 Mo. App. 380, 256 S.W. 544 (1923); Neibel v. Winslow, 88 N.J.L. 191, 95
Atl. 995 (Ct. Err. & App. 1915); Stafford v. St. Clair's Hospital, 9 App. Div.
560, 189 N.Y.S.2d 351 (Sup. Ct. 1959), wherein even though the surgeon
noticed, during the procedure, that the operating room was warmer than
usual, he proceeded. At the close of the operation, when the drapes were
removed, he discovered a burn on the patient's arm. This was caused by
a defective surgical lamp. The court held that the surgeon's actions did
not constitute negligence without proof that the operative procedure was
other than that customarily utilized, in view of the necessity of concentration on the operation.
55. Note, 34 MINN. L. REV. 266, 268 (1950).
56. McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 367, 65 A.2d 243, 248 (1949)
(dissenting opinion). Mr. Justice Stearne uses this point as the thrust of
his opinion.
57. Note, 34 MINN. L. REV. 266, 268 (1950).
op. Cit. supra note 38 at 41-3.

58.

WASMUTH,

59.

199 Fed. 760 (7th Cir. 1912).
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unless the anesthesiologist observed or should have observed the
negligent acts and did not object.
In Jett v. Linville60 the Kentucky court made clear its reasons
for holding the one administering anesthesia not liable for operative
negligence when it said:
It is a well established rule in surgical operations that the
anesthetist is directly chargeable with the physical condition of the patient in the operating room, and his attention
must always be directed solely to administering the proper
amount of the anesthetic and continuing its supply in just
such proportions as will insure the patient's remaining in a
comatose condition while the knife is being used.61
It is submitted that this Kentucky court's reasoning is equally
valid in the opposite direction. The surgeon's attention must always be directed solely to completing the procedure as quickly and
efficiently as possible. Pennsylvania courts' fiction of the surgeon
reigning supreme is a remnant of a by-gone surgical era-a remnant best forgotten if the law is to keep pace with the realities of
today's surgical practice.
When the question arose whether the surgeon could be implicated for negligence of the anesthesiologist on the rationale that
62
the surgeon secured his services, the court in Wiley v. Wharton
answered that the anesthesiologist's contract is between him and
the patient. The mere recommendation of the anesthesiologist by
the surgeon does not make him responsible for the anesthesiologist's
malpractice. The surgeon is not liable for injuries from negligent
administration of anesthesia when he not only recommends the
anesthesiologist, but also promises the patient she won't receive a
certain type of anesthesia.6 3 The court in Woodson v. Huey 64 said
that the surgeon's agreement with the plaintiff that she would
not get a spinal anesthetic meant that he would do all reasonably
possible to see that one was not given. The anesthesiologist, being
an expert, was not the surgeon's agent; therefore, the surgeon was
not liable for his negligence or for his administration of the anesthetic without proper consent.
In Brossard v. Koop6 5 Minnesota established its rule, later to be
followed in Thompson v. Lillehei.6 6 The Brossard court said:
The one giving the anesthetic must give close attention to
the patient, so as to keep him continuously unconscious, yet
short of endangering life. It was unthinkable that O'Conner should explore the wound . . . before the incision was
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
1959).

202 Ky. 198, 259 S.W. 43 (1924).
Id. at 201, 259 S.W. at 45.
68 Ohio App. 345, 41 N.E.2d 255 (1941).
Woodson v. Huey, 261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1953).
261 P.2d 199 (Okla. 1953).
200 Minn. 410, 274 N.W. 241 (1937).
164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), af'd, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir.
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closed. . . . If any doctor or nurse is negligent in any act
or omission connected with an operation, it is right and
just that such a one be held responsible; but, where several
have distinct and separate parts to take, which require the
undivided attention of each, only the one who fails to use
of the part assigned to him
due care in the performance
67
should be held responsible.
In Huber v. Protestant Deaconess Hospital Ass'n,68 the court
refused to hold a surgeon liable for an anesthesiologist's negligent
administration of a spinal anesthetic:
To hold Dr. McDonald liable under the circumstances
shown by this record would make a doctor liable for the
reports of a pathologist who has told a patient that tissue is
cancerous or benign, and for all the acts and recommendations of other types of similar specialists whose recommenway subject to the dominion
dations and acts are in no
and control of the surgeon. 69
It would seem that the Indiana court was remonstrating the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Following the reasoning of prior cases,
Pennsylvania could find a surgeon liable if during surgery he called
the pathologist to the operating room, questioned him, and because
of a negligent response, varied his procedure to the subsequent injury of the patient. Reasoning from Mazer, Rockwell, and Yorston, the court would be bound to so find. The absurdity of this
situation is obvious."0
67. Brossard v. Koop, 200 Minn. 410, 413, 274 N.W. 243, 243 (1937).
Accord, Nelson v. Sandell, 202 Iowa 109, 209 N.W. 440 (1926); Meyer v. St.
Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 61 So.2d 901 (La. Ct. App. 1952).
68. 127 Ind. App. 565, 133 N.E.2d 864 (1956).
69. Id. at 576, 133 N.E.2d at 869.
70. The pathologist, a specialist in the field of the gross and miscroscopic diagnosis of disease, takes a three year residency training. Like the
anesthesiologist, as a medical fact, he is not subject to the control of the
surgeon or any other practitioner of medicine. He establishes his diagnosis
from his clinical and miscroscopic examination. The surgeon does not have
the benefit of viewing or participating in this diagnosis; it is established in
the pathology laboratory. An example perhaps, will best illustrate the
point. Let us assume that the surgeon is performing a procedure to ascertain presence or absence of breast cancer. He removes the one area
which is suspect, and sends it to the laboratory for a miscroscopic diagnosis.
When the pathologist sends the report back to the operating room, the
surgeon still has some further questions about it. The surgeon calls the
pathologist to the operating room, and questions him further about the
specimen. The pathologist negligently reassures the surgeon that the specimen was benign (non-malignant). Because of this reassurance, the surgeon
simply closes the incision. If the report had been that the tissue was cancerous, some type of a radical (extensive) breast removal would have been
performed. Mazer, Rockwell, and Yorston reasoning would be that since
the pathologist came to the operating room at the request of the surgeon, he
was now within the orbit of the surgeon's control. The pathologist's negligent response is imputed to the surgeon, and the surgeon could be held
liable for the ultimate demise of the patient.
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In modern surgical practice with its ever-broadening scope, the
surgical team7 1 has become an everyday reality. This surgical setting has also given rise to malpractice litigation, with attempts to
place liability on "one controlling surgeon." Minnesota brushed
aside such an attempt in Thompson v. Lillehei.7T Plaintiff alleged
that she had contacted the surgeon, Dr. Lillehei, about surgery for
her daughter, and that he related there would be little operative
danger from air embolus. 73

Lillehei was the alleged surgeon in

charge of the operation, exercising supervision over all others participating in it. The evidence showed that the respective heads of
surgery and anesthesia each assigned particular physicians for these
heart surgery cases. The court referred to the "Captain-of-theShip" doctrine by name only to categorically repudiate it in this
factual setting:
And even assuming that Lillehei was 'surgeon-incharge' or 'Captain-of-the-Ship,' as urged, does it follow
that he is responsible for the negligence if any, of an anesthesiologist such as Dr. X, assigned to the case by his own
superior, exercising his own independent special medical
knowledge in performing his duties without any specific
directions from Lillehei? I don't think so. The cases so
indicate. .

.

.

To extend the doctrine of respondeat su-

perior to a situation such as that reflected in the evidence
would be
to strain the doctrine beyond the basis for its
74
creation.
This court showed remarkable clarity of perception of the basic
nature of the control concept; they recognized not only its inherent limitations, but also its possible evils were it to be applied as
Pennsylvania courts have done.
In Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trust.7 5 the

issue was whether a surgeon would be liable in respondeat superior
for alleged negligence of a special hospital team7 6 who performed
71. In the larger cities, where medical centers are located, the extremely complex surgery is performed. The typical case is the heart surgery team. This usually consists of from four to six physicians, all cardiac
surgeons. They are supported by a special nursing team. This nursing
team always assists at the heart surgery cases rather than the usual hospital
operating room nurses. There is also associated with the team a specialist
in Internal Medicine whose primary functions are to operate the heartlung machine, and to monitor the patient's fluid and blood volume. One
can readily see that attempting to hold one individual surgeon responsible
for all possible complications would be to require omniscience.
72. 164 F. Supp. 716 (D. Minn. 1958), affd, 273 F.2d 376 (8th Cir. 1959).
73. BLAKISTON, op. cit. supra note 4. An embolus is a particle of matter foreign in the blood stream-in this case air, which gains entrance to
the circulation and is carried by the blood stream until it lodges in a blood
vessel, causing obstruction.
74. Thompson v. Lillehei, 164 F. Supp. 716, 721 (D. Minn. 1958).
75. 154 Cal. App.2d 560, 317 P.2d 170 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
76. The term connotes a group of physicians working in a hospital
who perform certain highly difficult and technical procedures. These pro-
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an aortagram.7 7 The court said that the surgeon could not be held
for the team's negligence since he neither participated in it, nor
had any right to direct it:
When a patient is placed in a hospital his attending physician orders many procedures to be undertaken by the
hospital staff or employees. Common examples are urinalysis, blood counts and x-rays. Suppose that in extracting
blood for a count the hospital personnel negligently infected the patient. It could not be contended that the attending physician was liable for that negligence. The same
is true here. The attending physician cannot be held liable for acts over which he had and could have no control.
. . . The patient by the use of such a team gets the benefit of medical people who have become experts in the
particular procedure. 8
In Dohr v. Smith 79 Florida placed the relationship of anesthesiologist and surgeon in its proper perspective when it said:
The surgeon may have been generally in command from
the beginning of the operation to the end or, as appellants
term him in the brief, 'captain of the ship' but it is clear
to us that he and the anesthetist were working in highly
expert fields peculiar to each and that despite the common
goal, the successful repair of the patient's ulcer, their responsibilities were not inextricably bound together.80
Louisell and Williams"' feel that with the trend toward minute
specialization there has been a corresponding trend toward division
of responsibility for events occurring in the operating room. They
fear that to allow this trend to go unchecked might result in a potentially harmful fragmentation of control over the patient's safety.
While a definite allocation of responsibility between surgeon and
anesthesiologist is relatively easy to effect on a sensible basis, the
authors contend that an uncritical extension of this principle to
other relationships is fraught with danger to the patient.
It is submitted that there must be fragmentation of liability in
the eyes of the law where there actually is fragmentation of total
cedures are usually more along diagnostic lines. Typical examples would

be the aortagram and cardiac catheterization.

77. BLAKISTON, op. cit. supra note 4. Aortagram means picture of the
aorta. The aorta is the largest artery in the body running from the heart
downward, then dividing to send large arteries to the legs. It is the site
of frequent obstruction at approximately the level where it gives off
branches to the kidneys. To establish the presence of a block or a narrowing, and also its exact location, dye is injected into the aorta, and x-rays
in a perfected time sequence are taken to delineate the contour of the
vessel.
78. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. University Bd. of Trust., 154 Cal.
App.2d 560, 573-74, 317 P.2d 170, 178-9 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
79. 104 So.2d 29 (Fla. 1958).
80. Dohr v. Smith, 104 So.2d 29, 32 (Fla. 1958).
81.

(1960).
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patient responsibility as a matter of fact. To suggest otherwise is
to encourage the law to exist in a world of make-believe apart from
the realities of modern medicine. Where fragmentation is possible,
practical to effect, and medically desirable, courts should legally
recognize the concept of fragmentation, sanction it, and allocate
responsibility for negligence realistically.
The contention has been made that the patient looks only to
82
one man, the surgeon, for his protection in the operating room.
8
In the present era of pre-operative anesthetic rounds, the anesthesiologist explains that he will put the patient to sleep and be
responsible for the anesthesia. Thus it is a fiction to say that the
patient looks only to the surgeon for care.

82. See St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212
Minn. 558, 4 N.W.2d 637 (1942), wherein a surgeon and hospital were sued
for alleged negligence by hospital operating room nurses for obtaining and
using water which was too hot in washing the plaintiff's wound. The surgeon settled out of court. A suit was then brought against the hospital
with judgment for defendant hospital. This was affirmed on appeal. The
court held that the nurses were borrowed servants during the operation
and thus the hospital was not liable. The language of the St. Paul court is
revealing:
The desirability of the rule is obvious. The patient is completely at the mercy of the surgeon and relies upon him to see that
all the acts relative to the operation are performed in a careful
manner. It is the surgeon's duty to guard against any and all
avoidable acts that may result in injury to his patient ....

In the

operating room the surgeon must be master. He cannot tolerate
any other voice in the control of his assistants.
St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co. v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 212 Minn. 558, 561-62,
4 N.W.2d 637, 638-39 (1942). It is difficult to conceive of anyone having
any more control or power over the human body, when in the operating
room than the anesthesiologist. By the use of drugs, he ablates consciousness, then continues to move the patient even deeper to the stage of surgical anesthesia-called stage three. In the various planes of this stage the
vomiting, gag, and swallowing reflexes are ablated. When the proper plane
of this stage is reached, the patient is then maintained there during the
surgical procedure. The anesthesiologist then continuously monitors blood
pressure, heart rate, heart tone, respiratory rate, and blood loss. It must
be apparent that a patient, connected to the world as he left it only by the
skill and judgment of the anesthesiologist, looks, at least in some measure
to this specialist for care; see WASMUTH, op. cit. supra note 38, at 40-46,
wherein the traditional view as enunciated by the St. Paul court is stated,
followed by the author's views as to the present state of the law and reasons
for the change from the St. Paul concept.
83. Pre-operative anesthetic rounds is a medical term. On the day
before the planned surgical procedure, the anesthesiologist visits the patient
in his or her hospital room. The anesthesiologist explains his function to
the patient. He discusses various types of possible anesthesia, takes a past
medical history and performs whatever medical examination which he feels
is necessary. If the anesthesiologist feels that a certain type of anesthesia
is best, he will then make that recommendation to the patient. If several
types are equally suitable for the procedure, the anesthesiologist will allow
the patient his preference.
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CONCLUSION

Pennsylvania is by far the most extreme jurisdiction in placing
liability on the operating surgeon for negligent acts of others occurring pre-operatively. The Pennsylvania trend is an ever-widening orbit of liability for the embattled surgeon. It would seem
that his liability and ultimate responsibility can be made to encompass the entire hospital. Pennsylvania finds liability by applying the "Captain-of-the-Ship" doctrine with little or no real understanding of the modern hospital setting.
To the end that the doctrine provides a framework upon which
a factual situation is critically analyzed, it is good. However, when
the doctrine is used to determine liability by citing it as a conclusion of law, it becomes a juristic stumbling block which is better
eliminated from a court's analysis. It is best said, perhaps, that
it is not the doctrine which is bad, but rather Pennsylvania courts'
improper and illogical application of it. Other jurisdictions have
taken a realistic view of the doctrine and applied it successfully to
reach just results. In this age of specialization in the practice of
medicine, it is incumbent upon the courts to apply rules of law
with an intelligent understanding of the complexities and realities
of modern medicine and surgery.
DEmris M. MAioNIE, M.D.

